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Court	of	Appeal		 In	the	Matter	of	an	Application	by	Evelyn	White	for	Judicial	Review	
	[2000]	NI	432,	[2004]	NICA	1		20	April	2001		
	
O’ROURKE	LJ:	 		
Introduction	
	The	appellant	in	this	case,	Evelyn	White,	is	an	elderly	woman.	In	her	lifetime,	she	has	seen	remarkable	change	in	Northern	Ireland.	As	a	resident	of	the	Garvaghy	Road	in	Portadown,	a	site	of	some	of	the	most	entrenched	and	robust	sectarian	clashes	 in	 the	 jurisdiction,	 she	has	perhaps	seen	more	 than	most	of	 the	darker	side	of	 life	 in	Northern	 Ireland,	even	since	 the	Belfast/Good	Friday	Agreement.	Indeed,	 the	 clashes	 at	 the	 Garvaghy	 Road	 seem	 hopelessly	 immune	 to	 the	broader	more	positive	political	developments	 in	 the	 jurisdiction.	Evelyn	White,	given	her	position	at	the	coalface	of	sectarian	hostility	in	Northern	Ireland	at	the	time	of	this	application,	might	reasonably	have	wondered	‘what	peace	process?’			Evelyn	White	 is,	of	course,	at	 the	centre	of	 this	case,	although	 it	 is	very	easy	to	lose	sight	of	her	in	more	abstract	discussions	about	‘the	community’	and	what	it	means	 to	 be	 representative	 of	 that	 community	 and	 the	 symbolism	 and	significance	 of	 parading	 to	 ‘the	 community’.	 For	 parading	 did	 not	 have	 only	symbolic	significance	 to	Evelyn	White;	 it	had	 the	material	power	 to	dictate	her	daily	movements	and	the	movements	of	her	family.		Her	daily	experiences	must	have	 contrasted	 painfully	 with	 television	 images	 of	 landmark	 handshakes	between	formerly	bitterly	opposed	political	leaders,	and	media-friendly	shots	of	international	 leaders	 and	 music	 stars	 celebrating	 the	 success	 of	 the	 peace	agreement.	 Evelyn	 White’s	 daily	 life,	 by	 contrast,	 consisted	 of	 helicopters	constantly	 overhead,	 impeding	 her	 ability	 to	 sleep.	 Frequent	 blockades	 of	 her	street	meant	that	even	accessing	the	most	basic	of	foodstuffs	was	a	challenge,	not	to	mention	the	daily	battles	to	keep	younger	family	members	indoors	and	away	from	clashes	with	police	and	protestors.			The	 contrast	 between	 the	 high-profile	 political	 events	 of	 Northern	 Ireland’s	public	 life,	 with	 the	 ongoing	 disruption	 to	 the	 constrained	 private	 life	 of	 the	appellant,	is	a	contrast	that	is	lived	by	many	people	–	and	perhaps	in	particular	by	many	women	on	 the	Garvaghy	Road	–	 in	 this	 jurisdiction.	The	depth	of	 the	disappointment,	 even	 despair,	 felt	 by	 the	 people	 of	 Portadown,	 the	 Garvaghy	road	 residents	 and	 members	 of	 the	 Loyal	 Orders,	 that	 the	 achievement	 of	 a	cross-party	 political	 agreement	 endorsed	 by	 popular	 referendum	 had	 done	 so	little	to	dissipate	the	tension	and	violence	of	annual	parading	in	Portadown	must	have	been	acute.			
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Proceedings	to	Date		On	19	May	2000,	Carswell	 J	delivered	judgment	in	a	 judicial	review	application	by	Evelyn	White.	Ms	White	had	challenged	the	validity	of	the	appointment	by	the	Secretary	 of	 State	 for	 Northern	 Ireland	 of	 the	 members	 of	 the	 Parades	Commission	 for	 Northern	 Ireland	 (the	 Commission).	 She	 sought	 a	 declaration	that	 their	 appointment	 was	 unlawful,	 because	 the	 eventually	 constituted	Commission	contained	no	women	members,	which	she	claimed	was	a	breach	of	the	terms	of	the	Public	Processions	(Northern	Ireland)	Act	1998	(the	1998	Act).	Ms	White	is	a	resident	of	the	Garvaghy	Road	area	of	Portadown.			Ms	White	challenged	the	validity	of	the	appointments	on	a	number	of	grounds.	It	was	averred	 that	 the	Secretary	of	State	had	 failed	 to	comply	with	his	statutory	obligation	under	paragraph	2(3)	of	Schedule	1,	which	provides	that:		‘The	Secretary	of	State	shall	so	exercise	his	powers	of	appointment	under	this	paragraph	as	to	secure	that	as	far	as	is	practicable	the	membership	of	the	Commission	is	representative	of	the	community	in	Northern	Ireland.’	It	was	also	claimed	that	 the	Secretary	of	State	had	failed	to	take	 into	account	a	number	 of	 relevant	 considerations	 and	 that	 the	 failure	 to	 appoint	 a	 woman	constituted	 discrimination	 contrary	 to	 s	 75	 or	 76	 of	 the	 Northern	 Ireland	 Act	1998.			At	 the	 High	 Court,	 Carswell	 J	 indicated,	 obiter,	 that	 the	 obligation	 on	 the	Secretary	of	State	to	appoint	a	Commission	‘representative	of	the	community	in	Northern	Ireland’	referred,	in	the	context	of	parading,	to	the	two	sectarian	blocks	and	 not	 to	 the	 gender	 composition	 of	 the	 Commission.	 Further,	 on	 the	practicability	 issue,	 because	 of	 the	 practical	 difficulties	 encountered	 and	 the	need	to	appoint	on	merit	and	avoid	religious	imbalance,	the	Court	held	that	the	Minister	 took	all	 steps	open	 to	him	to	make	 the	Commission	representative.	 In	the	 circumstances,	 to	 appoint	 a	 Commission	 that	 included	 at	 least	 one	woman	would	 have	 required	 the	 appointment	 of	 a	 less	 qualified	 women	 ahead	 of	 a	better	 qualified	 man,	 which	 would	 have	 been	 unlawful.	 Finally,	 Carswell	 J	rejected	the	argument	that	public	commitments	made	by	the	Secretary	of	State	that	 appointments	 to	 the	 Parades	 Commission	 would	 be	 consistent	 with	 the	Guidance	published	by	the	Commissioner	for	Public	Appointments	gave	rise	to	a	legitimate	expectation	that	this	would	be	done.			The	 appellant	 appeals	 against	 that	 decision	 on	 a	 number	 of	 grounds.	 The	principal	arguments	advanced	by	the	appellant	on	the	hearing	of	the	appeal	may	be	broadly	summarised	as	follows:	-		1.	 The	judge	erred	in	law	by	interpreting	the	obligation	to	be	‘representative	of	the	community’	as	referring	only	to	the	sectarian	blocks,		2.	 The	 judge	 further	 erred	 in	 finding	 that	 the	 Secretary	 of	 State	 did	everything	 ‘as	 far	 as	 practicable’	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 appointments	 were	representative	of	the	community,		
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	3.	 The	judge	erred	in	holding	that	the	Secretary	of	State	had	acted	within	his	scope	of	discretion	in	approaching	a	man	from	outside	of	the	appointable	pool	to	fill	the	last	seat	of	the	all-male	Commission.				
Does	‘representative	of	the	community’	in	the	context	of	parading	refer	only	to	the	
two	sectarian	blocks?		
	Although	 this	 question	 was	 dealt	 with	 only	 in	 obiter	 comments	 by	 the	 High	Court,	because	of	its	relevance	to	the	assessment	of	the	practicability	question,	I	will	deal	with	this	question	first.			It	 is	often	remarked	that,	of	 the	approximately	3000	parades	that	 take	place	 in	Northern	 Ireland	each	year,	 it	 is	only	a	 small	group	which	give	 rise	 to	dispute.	Notwithstanding	 the	 relatively	 small	 number	 of	 disputed	 parades,	 the	 scale	 of	the	 dispute	 can	 be	 very	 serious.	 Consequently,	 the	 Parades	 Commission	 of	Northern	Ireland	was	established	in	1997	and	given	statutory	basis	in	1998.			In	 the	High	Court,	my	honourable	colleague	Carswell	 J	expressed	 the	view	that	the	term	‘representative	of	the	community’	referred,	in	the	context	of	parading,	to	the	two	main	sectarian	blocks.	Regrettably,	the	basis	for	this	belief	was	given	little	 elaboration	 by	 the	 Court,	 but	 appeared	 to	 rely	 on	 select	 sections	 of	 the	North	 Report,	 published	 in	 January	 1997,	 which	 led	 to	 the	 enactment	 of	 the	Parades	Commission.	The	North	Report	was	commissioned	by	the	then	Secretary	of	State	to	review	the	current	arrangements	for	handling	public	processions	and	open-air	public	meetings	and	associated	public	order	issues	in	Northern	Ireland	and	to	make	recommendations.	Chapter	12	of	the	North	Report	set	out	a	series	of	recommendations	to	the	Secretary	of	State:		‘Recommended	the	creation	of	an	independent	body	that	would:		(a)	 allow	interested	parties	to	put	their	views	forward	about	proposed	parades;		(b)	 encourage	them	to	settle	difficulties	locally,	and	where	that	proved	impossible,	(c)		 itself	come	to	a	view	on	what,	if	any,	conditions	should	be	imposed	on	 contentions	 parades	 after	 an	 appropriately	 transparent	 process	 of	examination	of	all	the	relevant	issues	against	the	background	of	reformed	legal	provisions,’		The	 composition	 of	 the	 proposed	 commission	 was	 accepted	 to	 be	 of	 critical	importance	 to	 its	 success	 (para	 12.31):	 it	 would	 need	widespread	 acceptance,	self-confidence	and	an	ability	in	its	members	to	work	together.	The	report	went	on	to	state:		 ‘The	Parades	Commission	would	need	to	have	a	geographical	spread	and	both	cross-community	and	gender	balance.’			
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The	 review	 body's	 recommendation	 was	 accepted,	 and	 a	 commission	 was	established	on	an	informal	basis	in	March	1997.	In	that	year	the	police	allowed	the	 parade	 to	 process	 down	 the	 Garvaghy	 Road,	 but	 the	 area	 was	 effectively	sealed	 off	 and	 residents	were	 confined	 to	 their	 homes	 for	 a	 number	 of	 hours.	Steps	 were	 then	 taken	 to	 give	 the	 commission	 formal	 recognition,	 and	 in	February	1998	the	Public	Processions	(Northern	Ireland)	Act	1998	was	enacted.	This	 established	 the	 commission	 as	 a	body	with	 a	 chair	 	 (or	 ‘chairman’,	 as	 the	legislation	 stipulates)	 and	 up	 to	 6	members.	 Its	 duties,	 expressed	 in	 section	 2,	were	 in	 part	 educational	 and	 advisory	 but	 included	 the	 promotion	 and	facilitation	 of	 mediation	 as	 a	 means	 of	 resolving	 disputes	 about	 public	processions.	 It	was	 empowered	 under	 the	 same	 section	 to	 facilitate	mediation	between	 parties	 to	 particular	 disputes,	 to	 take	 such	 other	 steps	 as	 might	 be	appropriate	 to	 resolve	 such	disputes	 and	 to	 issue	determinations	 in	 respect	 of	particular	 proposed	 public	 processions.	 It	 was	 to	 issue	 a	 code	 of	 conduct	 for	those	organising	or	taking	part	 in	public	processions	or	public	meetings	and	to	issue	procedural	 rules	 and	guidelines.	Under	 section	8	 it	had	power	 to	 impose	conditions	 on	 those	 organising	 or	 taking	 part	 in	 proposed	 public	 processions,	prescribing	 among	 other	 things	 the	 route	 to	 be	 followed.	 Criminal	 penalties	attached	to	wilful	breach	of	conditions	imposed	by	the	commission.	Relevant	for	present	purposes	is	paragraph	2(3)	of	Schedule	1	to	the	Act:	‘The	Secretary	of	State	shall	so	exercise	his	powers	of	appointment	under	this	paragraph	as	to	secure	that	as	far	as	is	practicable	the	membership	of	the	Commission	is	representative	of	the	community	in	Northern	Ireland.’			In	the	lower	court,	Carswell	J	indicated	at	page	440	that	he	was		‘not	 altogether	 persuaded	 that	 the	 phrase	 ‘representative	 of	 the	community’	in	paragraph	2(3)	of	Schedule	1	to	the	1998	Act	was	intended	to	 mean	 that	 there	 should	 be	 gender	 balance,	 or	 at	 least	 some	representation…	The	phrase	in	question	does	not	refer	to	gender	or	to	the	make-up	 of	 the	 population	 of	 the	 Province.	 It	 refers	 specifically	 to	 ‘the	community’,	which	in	the	context	of	parades	is	constantly	used	to	demote	the	 different	 sectarian	 blocks	 ---	 see,	 for	 example,	 the	 reference	 in	paragraph	 1.15	 and	 1.16	 of	 the	 North	 Report	 to	 ‘another	 part	 of	 our	community’	 and	 ‘the	 other	 part	 of	 the	 community’,	 which	 are	 plainly	references	to	the	sectarian	divide’.				Carswell	 J’s	 interpretation	of	 the	meaning	attached	 to	 the	 term	 ‘community’	 in	the	 North	 Report	 is	 based	 on	 a	 partial	 and	 selective	 reading	 of	 said	 report.	Contrary	 to	 the	 assertion	 that	 community	 refers	 in	 the	 report	 to	 the	 sectarian	blocks,	 ‘community’	 is	given	many	and	varied	meanings	 throughout	 the	report.	While	 there	 is	 indeed	 reference	 to	 ‘the	 two	 parts	 of	 the	 community’,		‘communities’	is	also	used	in	a	plural	sense	to	refer	to	the	communities	living	in	the	 various	 areas	 of	 contested	 marches	 in	 Northern	 Ireland	 (para	 1.17),	 ‘the	various	 parts	 of	 the	 community’	 referring	 to	more	 than	 two	 sides	 (para	 1.38).	Moreover,	 the	Report	recognizes	 internal	diversity	within	different	parts	of	 the	community	 (‘some	 sections	 of	 the	 Nationalist	 part	 of	 the	 community	 have	 felt	excluded	 from	 those	discussions	over	 their	 future’,	 para	1.41).	Throughout	 the	Report,	‘community’	is	frequently	used	to	refer	all	individuals	living	in	Northern	
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Ireland,	that	is	one	single	community	(‘the	community’,	passim).	I	do	not	agree,	therefore,	 with	 my	 honourable	 colleague’s	 reliance	 on	 the	 North	 Report	 to	ground	a	belief	that	the	reference	to	the	community	in	the	legislation	refers	only	to	the	sectarian	blocks.	This	 is	a	question	that	merits	 further	 interrogation	and	reflection.			The	 appointments	 to	 the	 first	 Parades	 Commission	 were	 also	 the	 subject	 of	judicial	 review	 on	 the	 grounds	 of	 ‘representativeness’.	 In	 the	 Matter	 of	 an	
Application	for	Judicial	Review	by	Jane	Elizabeth	Armstrong	 (Unreported.	 Belfast	High	Court,	3rd	and	29th	April	1998),	 it	was	argued	on	behalf	of	 the	applicant	that	two	of	the	Catholic	appointments	were	 ‘non-nationalist	Catholics’	and	thus	failed	to	provide	an	adequate	counter-balance	to	the	two	loyalist	appointees	and	thus	 the	 two	 Catholic	 appointees	 were	 not	 ‘representative’	 of	 the	 community	which	 they	 appeared	 to	 have	 been	 selected	 to	 represent.	 The	 application	was	ultimately	 unsuccessful,	 but	 the	 case	 raised	 the	 vital	 question	 of	 whether	 the	term	 ‘representative’	 implied	 that	 the	 Commission	 should	 be	 an	 exact	mirror-image	 of	 society	 on	 political,	 religious,	 gender	 or	 geographical	 grounds.	 The	judge	held	(in	relation	to	the	two	catholic	appointees)	that	‘representative	of	the	community’	 was	 not	 necessarily	 achieved	 by	 choosing	 candidates	 to	 be	 pitted	against	 one	 another.	 Rather,	 candidates	 should	 be	 representative	 of	 ‘a	 wide	spectrum	 and	 broad	 diversity’.	 Of	 further	 significance	 in	 this	 regard	 is	 the	recognition	by	the	North	Report	of	the	diversity	of	parades	conducted	each	year	in	Northern	Ireland.	Relying	on	Royal	Ulster	Constabulary	statistics,	 the	Report	notes	 that	 of	 the	 1996	parades,	 2404	were	 held	 by	 organisations	 identified	 as	Loyalist,	 230	 by	 Nationalist	 organisations,	 and	 526	 by	 ‘others’,	 the	 latter	designation	 referred	 to,	 for	 example,	marches	 by	 guides	 and	 scouts	 and	 trade	unions	 (para	 3.1).	 The	 Report	 itself	 noted	 that	 ‘there	would	 be	merit	 in	 there	being	 a	 rather	 fuller	 breakdown	 of	 these	 categories,	 to	 reflect	 more	 fully	 the	diversity	 of	 organisations	 and	 parades’	 (para	 3.47).	 The	 North	 Report	 also	dedicated	 extensive	 discussion	 to	 ‘the	 views	 of	 other	 interested	 parties’,	recognizing	that	not	just	marching	groups	and	residents	had	a	stake	in	the	issue	and	were	impacted	by	parading	disputes,	 for	example	peace	constituencies	and	business	people	(6.18	–	6.30).				Contrary	 to	 High	 Court’s	 determination	 that	 parading	 in	 Northern	 Ireland	‘referred	 to	 the	 two	 Sectarian	 blocks’,	 therefore,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 there	 is	much	greater	 diversity	 evident	 in	 parading	 in	 the	 jurisdiction.	 While	 parading	 in	Northern	 Ireland	 is	 typically	 regarded	 as	 a	 male	 activity,	 parades	 routinely	include	women.	For	example,	a	distinct	women's	organisation	grew	up	out	of	the	Orange	 Order.	 Called	 the	 Association	 of	 Loyal	 Orangewomen	 of	 Ireland,	 this	organisation	was	revived	in	December	1911	having	been	dormant	since	the	late	1880s.	They	have	risen	in	prominence	in	recent	years,	largely	due	to	protests	in	Drumcree.	The	women's	order	 is	parallel	 to	the	male	order,	and	participates	 in	its	 parades	 as	much	 as	 the	males	 apart	 from	 'all	male'	 parades	 and	 'all	 ladies'	parades	 respectively.	 The	 contribution	 of	 women	 to	 the	 Orange	 Order	 is	recognised	in	the	song	‘Ladies	Orange	Lodges	O!’	There	is	considerable	evidence	of	the	operation	of	flourishing	of	the	Association	since	the	early	1900s.	Laws	and	
ordnances	 (sic)	 of	 the	 Association	 of	 Loyal	 Orange	 women	 of	 Ireland	 was	published	 in	 1888.	 Having	 become	 somewhat	 dormant	 thereafter,	 the	
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organisation	 experienced	 a	 revival	 in	 1911	 and	 has	 been	 active	 ever	 since.	 In	addition	 to	 the	 Association	 of	 Loyal	 Orange	Women	 of	 Ireland,	 there	 is	 also	 a	Junior	 Orange	 Women’s	 Association	 of	 Ireland.	 	 By	 the	 Orange	 Order’s	 own	figures,	 there	 are	 over	 100	 lodges	 of	 the	 Association	 of	 Loyal	 Orange	Women,	with	over	2,500	members.	Information	on	the	gender	profile	of	other	groups	and	organisations	engaged	in	parades	(e.g.	nationalist	organisations	commemorating	the	Easter	Rising,	or	trade	union	marches	to	mark	May	Day)	is	unfortunately	not	as	 readily	 available,	 but	 a	 Ladies	 Ancient	 Order	 of	 Hibernians	 and	 a	 female	auxiliary	to	the	Ancient	Order,	known	as	the	Daughters	of	Erin,	are	documented.	There	 is	 little	 reason	 to	 believe	 that	 women	 are	 not	 present	 in	 significant	numbers	within	those	groups	and	organisations	also.			Moreover,	it	is	clear	that	women	as	well	as	men	are	impacted	by	decisions	of	the	Parades	Commission.	Unlike	my	distinguished	colleague	in	the	High	Court,	I	have	had	 the	 advantage	 of	 seeing	 the	 exhaustive	 report	 of	 the	 Rosemary	 Nelson	Inquiry	 before	 arriving	 at	 my	 determination	 in	 this	 decision.	 The	 report	 is	instructive	for	several	reasons,	not	least	in	capturing	the	exigent	circumstances	that	form	the	backdrop	to	this	 judicial	review,	that	 is	the	profound	disturbance	to	daily	life	posed	by	the	contentious	parades	to	all	residents	of	Portadown,	the	extreme	–	often	violent	–	hostility	faced	by	the	marchers,	and	the	impact	of	this	apparently	 local	 disturbance	 on	 political	 and	 public	 life	 throughout	 the	jurisdiction.	Indeed,	the	Rosemary	Nelson	inquiry	Report	noted	that:			 There	 were	 fears	 that	 Drumcree	 had	 the	 potential	 to	 derail	 the	 Peace	Process.	One	senior	Northern	Ireland	Office	official	told	us:	‘Drumcree	had	become	a	microcosm	for	political	and	other	issues	in	Northern	Ireland.	It	we	were	unable	to	resolve	this	issue,	then	a	lot	of	other	things	could	fall	apart.	 Drumcree	 had	 shown	 its	 potential	 to	 act	 like	 a	 septic	 sore,	poisoning	 Northern	 Ireland	 and	 damaging	 the	 political	 settlement	process,	with	 the	 risk	of	de-stabilising	 the	Good	Friday	Agreement’.	The	Prime	Minister	was	advised	on	25	June	1998	that	 it	was	 ‘not	 impossible	that	 Drumcree	 could	 lead	 to	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	 whole	 [Good	 Friday]	Agreement’	(para	7.6).			That	the	stakes	were	high	in	Drumcree	in	1998	is	a	matter	of	public	record.	From	these	brief,	though	revealing,	comments,	it	is	surely	clear	that	the	subject	matter	of	 the	 Parades	 Commission	 is	 anything	 but	 a	 narrow	 sectarian	matter.	 Rather,	parading	 stands	 at	 the	 centre	 of	 the	 process	 to	 end	 Northern	 Ireland’s	 three	decades	of	violence	and	to	secure	a	peaceful,	democratic	and	 inclusive	political	dispensation	 for	 the	 benefit	 of	 the	 entire	 community.	 Women	 are	 regular	participants	 in	parades.	Moreover,	women’s	daily	 lives,	 in	particular	 in	 sites	of	contentious	parades,	are	heavily	shaped	by	decisions	to	permit,	deny	or	re-route	parades.	Women	have	a	fundamental	interest	in	the	operation,	deliberation	and	effectiveness	of	the	Parades	Commission.			I	 conclude,	 therefore,	 that	 the	 judge	 erred	 in	 law	 in	 determining	 that,	 in	 the	context	 of	 parading,	 ‘representative	 of	 the	 community’	 referred	 only	 to	 the	sectarian	 blocks.	 This	 question	 is	 not,	 however,	 determinative	 of	 the	merits	 of	the	 appeal.	 The	 Court	 must	 further	 consider	 whether	 the	 Secretary	 of	 State	
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operated	within	 the	 scope	of	his	discretion	 in	 failing	 to	appoint	 any	women	 to	the	 Commission	 and	 whether	 he	 acted	 ‘as	 far	 as	 practicable’	 to	 ensure	 the	representativeness	of	the	Commission.				
What	is	the	scope	of	the	Secretary	of	State’s	discretion	to	appoint?			It	was	stated	by	the	lower	court,	and	is	affirmed	here,	that	the	Secretary	of	State	is	 afforded	 wide	 discretion	 by	 the	 Parades	 Commission	 Act	 schedule	 2(3)	 in	making	appointments	to	the	Commission.	It	is	in	my	view	clear	that	the	statutory	discretion	given	to	the	Secretary	of	State	to	secure	that	as	far	as	is	practicable	the	membership	of	the	Commission	is	representative	of	the	community	in	Northern	Ireland	gives	him	a	wide	discretion	in	relation	to	the	interests	which	he	can	take	into	account.	This	demonstrates	the	diversity	of	interests	which	the	Secretary	of	State	 is	 entitled	 to	 take	 into	 account	 and	 is	 consistent	 with	 the	 respondent’s	position	 that	 his	 decision	 is	 an	 evaluative	 judgment.	 I	 accept	 the	 respondent’s	argument	that	appointments	to	the	Commission	belong	to	a	category	of	decisions	where	the	threshold	for	judicial	intervention	is	high.	A	large	area	of	discretion	is	available	 to	 the	 decision-maker	 particularly	 because	 of	 the	 political	 content	 of	the	decision.	It	is	the	court’s	function	only	to	ascertain	whether	the	decider	has	taken	into	account	the	correct	considerations	and	made	the	decision	within	the	proper	parameters	by	correct	application	of	 the	 law.	The	proper	parameters	of	the	Secretary	of	State’s	discretion	are	set	out	by	the	legislation:			 ‘The	Secretary	of	State	shall	so	exercise	his	powers	of	appointment	under	this	paragraph	as	to	secure	that	as	far	as	is	practicable	the	membership	of	the	Commission	is	representative	of	the	community	in	Northern	Ireland.’		It	 is	 evident,	 however,	 that	 the	 proper	 parameters	 of	 the	 Secretary	 of	 State’s	discretion	were	altered	by	the	Secretary	of	State	and	erroneously	affirmed	by	the	High	Court.	Whereas	 the	 legislation	 refers	 to	 the	qualified	 requirement	 for	 the	appointments	 to	 be	 ‘representative	 of	 the	 community’,	 this	 was	 in	 fact	interpreted	to	mean	the	achievement	of	‘religious	balance’	in	the	composition	of	the	Commission.	 	 In	both	the	submissions	to	 the	Court,	and	 in	 the	High	Court’s	presentation	of	 the	 legal	 issues	 to	be	addressed	 in	 the	case,	 this	altering	of	 the	terms	 of	 the	 Secretary	 of	 State’s	 discretion	 is	 apparent.	 To	 draw	 on	 the	 High	Court’s	 dealing	 with	 this	 issue,	 when	 the	 recruitment	 process	 resulted	 in	 an	uneven	number	of	Catholic	and	Protestant	members	and	no	female	members:			 ‘The	Secretary	of	State	was	then	faced	with	the	necessity	to	adopt	one	of	several	possible	courses	of	action,	none	of	which	was	ideal.	He	considered	and	rejected	the	following	as	undesirable,	for	the	reasons	set	out	against	each:		(a)	 to	 go	 to	 the	 reserve	 list	 --	 as	 the	 persons	 on	 this	 list	 were	 all	Protestants,	 the	 appointment	 of	 one	 of	 them	 would	 have	 meant	 an	undesirable	religious	imbalance	in	the	membership	of	the	Commission;		
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(b)	to	appoint	a	Catholic	female	who	did	not	get	on	to	the	reserve	list	–	he	considered	 that	 it	would	be	contrary	 to	 the	requirements	of	 the	general	law	prohibiting	discrimination	on	grounds	of	sex	or	religion	to	appoint	a	woman	who	was	not	as	well	qualified	as	those	on	the	reserve	list	(and	did	not	reach	the	merit	threshold	for	the	post)	in	order	to	maintain	a	religious	
balance;		(c)	 to	 put	 back	 the	 date	 on	which	 the	 new	 Commission	was	 to	 take	 up	office	 --	 there	 would	 then	 have	 been	 a	 period	 of	 indeterminate	 length	when	no	Commission	was	in	operation;		(d)	 to	 let	 the	 new	 Commission	 commence	 its	 work	 without	 filling	 the	vacancy	 --	 it	 would	 then	 have	 operated	 for	 a	 period	 with	 a	 religious	
imbalance	until	a	suitable	appointment	could	be	made.’		From	the	submissions	 to	Court	and	the	reasoning	of	 the	 lower	court,	 it	 is	clear	that	 the	 Secretary	 of	 State	 and	 the	 High	 Court	 has	 substituted	 the	 qualified	requirement	of	 community	 representativeness	with	a	 requirement	of	 ‘religious	balance’.	The	scope	of	the	Secretary	of	State’s	discretion	is	wide,	but	he	or	she	is	not	 free	 to	 alter	 the	 terms	 (or	 proper	 parameters)	 of	 the	 statutory	 discretion.	There	 is	 no	 judicial	 authority	 for	 so	 interpreting	 ‘representative	 of	 the	community’.	 Indeed,	 the	 authority	 that	 does	 exist	 is	 directly	 contrary	 to	 this	narrowing	 of	 the	 ‘representativeness’	 standard	 and	 instead	 interprets	representative	of	the	community	to	mean	‘a	wide	spectrum	and	broad	diversity’	(In	 re	Armstrong).	 The	 question	 remains	 as	 to	 whether	 the	 Secretary	 of	 State	acted	‘as	far	as	practicable’	to	ensure	that	the	Commission	was	representative	of	the	community,	where	‘representativeness’	is	not	reduced	to	meaning	‘sectarian	balance’.					
Did	the	Secretary	of	State	act	‘as	far	as	practicable’	to	ensure	representativeness?			The	under-representation	of	women	is	a	stark	fact	of	Northern	Irish	public	 life.	Indeed,	 it	 was	 an	 issue	 specifically	 identified	 for	 redress	 in	 the	 Belfast/Good	Friday	 Agreement,	 which	 guaranteed	 ‘the	 right	 of	 women	 to	 full	 and	 equal	political	 participation’	 (6.1),	 although	 this	 provision	 was	 not	 included	 in	 the	Northern	Ireland	Act	1998	which	gave	legislative	effect	to	the	peace	agreement.	The	irony	is	not	lost	on	this	member	of	the	bench	of	this	Court,	as	its	first	female	appointment,	 to	 adjudicate	 on	 the	 lawfulness	 of	 the	 failure	 to	 appoint	 any	women	to	the	Parades	Commission.	While	the	recent	years	of	the	peace	process	and	new	institutions	established	by	the	Belfast	Agreement	have	offered	promise	in	 many	 respects,	 the	 seeming	 immutability	 of	 the	 under-representation	 of	women	 within	 public	 appointments	 in	 the	 jurisdiction	 persists.	 Indeed,	 the	percentage	of	women	in	overall	public	appointments	has	in	fact	fallen	since	the	signing	 of	 the	 Belfast	 Agreement.	 In	 1998,	 35%	 of	 the	 membership	 of	 public	boards	in	Northern	Ireland	was	made	up	of	women;	in	2000,	that	percentage	had	reduced	to	32%.			
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Even	 compared	 to	 this	 unsatisfactorily	 low	 percentage	 of	 women	 in	 public	appointments	 in	 the	 jurisdiction	 generally,	 the	 number	 of	 female	 applicants	 to	the	Parades	Commission	was	particularly	low.	The	term	of	office	of	the	first	chair	and	members	 of	 the	 Commission	 was	 due	 to	 expire	 on	 18	 February	 2000.	 In	October	1999	the	Secretary	of	State	put	in	train	the	process	of	appointment	of	a	fresh	set	of	members,	to	take	up	office	on	19	February	2000	for	a	two-year	term.	Advertisements	inviting	applications	for	appointment	were	placed	in	the	press	in	early	October	1999,	setting	out	the	function	of	the	Commission	and	the	terms	of	appointment	 of	 the	members.	 The	 advertisement	 described	 the	 skills	 required	for	membership	 of	 the	 Commission	 as:	 assessing/evaluating;	 decision-making;	team	working;	and	presentation.	A	total	of	82	persons	applied	for	membership	of	the	 Commission,	 of	 which	 46,	 or	 83%,	 were	male	 and	 only	 14,	 or	 17%,	 were	female.	 An	 interview	 panel	 considered	 the	 applications	 against	 the	 advertised	criteria	 for	 appointment	 and	 shortlisted	 23	 candidates	 for	 interview,	 of	whom	three	(13%),	were	female,	thus	further	reducing	the	proportion	of	women	under	consideration.	 Further	 to	 interview,	 16	 candidates	 were	 deemed	 appointable,	consisting	of	13	Protestant	males,	one	Catholic	male,	one	Protestant	female	and	one	Catholic	female,	thus	further	reducing	the	proportion	of	women	eligible	for	appointment	 to	 12.5%.	 These	 16	 persons	 were	 ranked	 by	 merit,	 and	 the	Secretary	of	State	was	recommended	to	appoint	the	first	six.	Those	six	persons	consisted	of	 four	Protestant	males,	 one	Catholic	male	 and	one	Catholic	 female.	The	reserve	list,	being	the	remainder	of	the	16	ranked	persons,	then	consisted	of	one	Protestant	female	and	the	rest	were	Protestant	males.			The	 Secretary	 of	 State	 accepted	 the	 panel’s	 advice	 and	 the	 Northern	 Ireland	Office	(NIO)	approached	the	six	persons	selected.	 Initially	all	of	 them	indicated	their	 willingness	 to	 accept	 appointment,	 and	 arrangements	 were	 made	 to	announce	 the	 composition	 of	 the	 new	 Commission.	 Three	 days	 before	 the	announcement,	 the	 female	 appointee	 informed	 the	 NIO	 that	 she	 would	 not	accept	an	offer	of	appointment.	 	 In	 the	event,	as	established	by	the	High	Court,	the	Secretary	of	State	decided	 that	 in	 the	exceptional	circumstances	which	had	arisen	that	the	NIO	should	approach	a	person	directly	who	they	judged	met	the	necessary	competences.	On	 this	basis,	an	existing	male	Catholic	member	of	 the	Commission	 who	 had	 not	 applied	 for	 membership	 was	 approached	 but	 he	declined	 to	 consider	 appointment.	 An	 approach	 was	 then	 made	 to	 Mr	 Peter	Quinn,	who	had	considerable	experience	in	the	context	of	the	parades	issue	and	had	been	a	facilitator	in	talks	concerning	the	Drumcree	parade	in	1998	and	1999.		The	 Secretary	 of	 State	 met	 Mr	 Quinn	 personally	 on	 7	 February	 2000	 and	 Mr	Quinn	indicated	that	he	would	accept	appointment.			The	Secretary	of	State	 is	enjoined	by	paragraph	2(3)	of	Schedule	1	to	the	1998	Act	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	membership	of	 the	Commission	 is	 representative	 of	 the	community	 ‘as	 far	 as	 practicable’.	 I	 concur	 with	 the	 interpretation	 of	 this	requirement	 adopted	 by	my	honourable	 colleague	 Justice	 Carswell	 in	 the	High	Court.	 ‘Practicable’	 is	 a	 more	 stringent	 standard	 than	 ‘reasonably	 practicable’,	see,	 eg.	 Gregson	v.	Hick	Hargreaves	&	Co	Ltd	 [1955]	 3	 All	 ER	 507,	 at	 516,	 per	Parker	 LJ.	 I	 concur	 with	 Carswell	 J’s	 assessment	 that	 ‘practicable’	 in	 many	contexts	 ‘means	 feasible,	 which	 is	 probably	 the	 nearest	 to	 a	 synonym	 for	 the	term’.	 In	 line	 with	 Carswell	 J,	 I	 take	 notice	 of	 the	 judgment	 of	 Boreham	 J	 in	
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Brookes	v	J	&	P	Coats	Ltd	[1984]	1	All	ER	702	at	719g,	where	he	was	dealing	with	a	 factory	 occupier’s	 statutory	 duty	 under	 section	 of	 the	 Factories	 Act	 1961	 to	make	effective	and	suitable	provision	 to	render	harmless,	 so	 far	as	practicable,	all	such	fumes,	dust	etc	as	might	be	injurious	to	health.	He	state	in	the	course	of	his	judgment:			 ‘I	 take	 practicable	 in	 this	 context	 to	mean	 a	 precaution	which	 could	 be	taken	or	undertaken	without	practical	difficulty.’		In	 the	 present	 context,	 the	 obligation	 placed	 upon	 the	 Secretary	 of	 State	 to	ensure	 the	 representative	 nature	 of	 the	 membership	 of	 the	 Commission	 is	qualified	by	the	provision	that	it	is	to	be	representative	of	the	community	as	far	as	 is	 practicable.	 Certain	 practical	 limits	 are	 placed	 by	 the	 small	 size	 of	 the	Commission	upon	his	ability	to	make	the	membership	representative.	The	need	to	 observe	 the	 merit	 principle	 in	 appointments	 constitutes	 another	 very	important	practical	constraint.				The	 lower	 court’s	 formulation	of	 the	 Secretary	 of	 State’s	 options	 as	 to	 appoint	either	 ‘a	 less	qualified	woman’	or	 ‘a	better	qualified	man’	 is	wrong	on	the	 facts	and	 flawed	 on	 the	 law.	 The	 lower	 court	 erred	 in	 interpreting	 that	 the	appointment	of	a	less	qualified	candidate	than	those	on	the	reserve	list	was	the	only	option	open	to	 the	Secretary	of	State	 if	he	wished	to	appoint	a	woman.	 In	fact,	when	the	public	appointments	process	failed	to	deliver	an	equal	‘balance’	of	Catholic	 and	Protestant	 representatives,	 the	 Secretary	 of	 State	 and	his	 officials	chose	 to	 move	 entirely	 outside	 that	 process	 and	 to	 directly	 approach	 an	individual,	 Mr	 Quinn,	 whom	 they	 considered	 desirable	 for	 the	 position	 and	whose	 appointment	 would	 secure	 the	 desired	 sectarian	 ‘balance’	 of	 the	Commission.	The	respondents	failed,	however,	to	consider	whether	approaching	a	Catholic	woman	would	be	appropriate,	in	light	of	the	absence	of	any	women	on	the	Commission.	Once	 the	Secretary	of	 State	moved	outside	of	 the	appointable	pool	 identified	 through	 independent	assessment	and	 the	normal	procedures	of	the	 Office	 of	 the	 Commissioner	 for	 Public	 Appointments	 (OCPA),	 he	 was	 not	limited	to	choosing	between	only	 ‘a	 less	qualified	woman’	or	 ‘a	better	qualified	man’	and	the	High	Court	erred	in	accepting	this	formulation	of	the	respondent’s	options.	Rather,	the	respondent	was	free	to	approach	anyone	judged	to	meet	the	necessary	competences	and	furthered	the	objective	of	appointing	a	Commission	that	was	 ‘representative	 of	 the	 community,	 as	 far	 as	 practicable’.	 Based	 on	 an	erroneous	 interpretation	of	what	 constitutes	 ‘the	 community’	 in	 the	 context	 of	parading,	and	based	on	a	flawed	formulation	of	the	options	open	to	the	Secretary	of	State,	the	respondents	failed	to	consider	approaching	a	Catholic	woman	to	fill	the	sixth	seat	on	the	Commission.			No	reasonable	person,	knowing	of	 the	 importance	of	parading	decision-making	and	the	recognized	value	of	including	women	in	this	decision-making,	could	have	failed	 to	 consider	 approaching	 a	 woman	 in	 these	 circumstances	 in	 order	 to	secure	a	Commission	that	is	‘representative	of	the	community’.		The	respondents	do	 not	 appear	 to	 have	 considered	 whether	 a	 suitably	 qualified	 woman	 could	have	been	identified	and	approached	for	the	sixth	position.	They	do	not	appear	to	have	considered	whether	 the	activities	and	decisions	of	a	body	 including	no	
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women	would	command	widespread	acceptance	among	the	general	public.	Had	these	matters	been	addressed,	as	 in	my	opinion	they	plainly	should	have	been,	the	 conclusion	 would	 have	 been	 reached	 (and	 certainly	 should	 have	 been	reached)	that	appropriate	efforts	were	necessary	to	consider	a	suitably	qualified	woman	for	the	final	position	on	the	Commission.	It	was	one	thing	to	ensure	that	the	sectarian	balance	was	maintained	within	the	Commission,	but	quite	another	to	 fail	 to	 consider	 approaching	 a	 suitably	 qualified	 female	 candidate	 in	 the	circumstances.			I	 consider	 therefore	 that	 the	 appointment	 process	 of	 the	 sixth	member	 of	 the	Commission	was	unlawful	 in	that	 the	Secretary	of	State’s	officials	 failed	to	take	into	account	a	material	consideration	as	a	result	of	which	they	failed	to	secure	as	far	as	was	practicable	that	member	of	the	Commission	was	representative	of	the	community	in	Northern	Ireland.	It	is	not	enough	that	a	consideration	is	one	that	may	properly	be	taken	into	account,	nor	even	that	it	is	one	which	many	people,	including	the	court	itself,	would	have	taken	into	account	if	they	had	to	make	the	decision.	 If	 there	are	matters	 so	obviously	material	 to	a	decision	 that	 anything	short	of	direct	consideration	of	them	by	a	minister	would	not	be	in	accordance	with	the	intention	of	the	Act	they	would	constitute	relevant	considerations	to	be	taken	into	account.	I	am	satisfied	that	the	decision	of	the	Secretary	of	State	was	flawed	because	he	relied	on	the	absence	of	an	appropriately	qualified	woman	in	the	 reserve	pool	 as	 sufficient	 evidence	 to	 ground	 a	 belief	 that	 no	 such	woman	was	available	anywhere	in	the	jurisdiction.	A	similar	conclusion	was	not	drawn	from	the	absence	of	an	appropriately	qualified	Catholic	man	 in	 the	reserve	 list.	This	 was	 a	 matter	 so	 obviously	 material	 to	 the	 decision	 which	 was	 taken	 to	appoint	Mr	Quinn	that	failure	to	take	it	into	consideration	was	not	in	accordance	with	the	contention	of	the	1998	Act.	As	a	result,	the	Secretary	of	State	was	unable	to	comply	with	para	2(3)	of	Sch	1	of	the	1998	Act	whereby	he	was	required	to	exercise	his	powers	of	appointment	so	as	to	secure	that	as	far	as	was	practicable	the	 membership	 of	 the	 Commission	 was	 representative	 of	 the	 community	 in	Northern	Ireland.			In	the	context	of	appointments	to	the	Parades	Commission,	the	choice	of	six	men	and	no	women	upsets	the	balance	to	such	an	extent	as	to	render	the	membership	of	 the	 Commission	 unrepresentative	 of	 the	 community.	 I	 cannot	 accept	 the	proposition	 that	 if	 one	 appoints	 no	 women,	 yet	 nevertheless	 maintains	 a	sectarian	 balance,	 one	 is	 securing	 as	 far	 as	 practicable	 a	 Commission	which	 is	representative	of	 the	 community	 in	Northern	 Ireland.	 I	 feel	 bound	 to	 conclude	that	 the	decision	 to	appoint	Mr	Quinn,	without	giving	due	consideration	 to	 the	appointment	 of	 a	 suitably	 qualified	 woman,	 was	 one	 which	 a	 reasonable	Secretary	of	State	could	not	have	made	if	properly	directing	himself	on	the	law,	if	seized	of	the	relevant	facts	and	it	taking	account	of	considerations	which,	in	this	context,	 he	 was	 bound	 to	 take	 into	 account.	 The	 appointment	 was	 therefore	unlawful.				It	is	clear	that	the	difficulty	in	appointing	a	suitably	qualified	female	is	linked	to	the	small	number	of	female	applicants	to	the	Commission.	It	seems	reasonable	to	conclude	 that	 it	 was	 this	 particularly	 low	 number	 of	 female	 applicants	 to	 the	Parades	 Commission	 that	 likely	 contributed	 to	 the	 perception	 that	 there	were	
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few	appropriately	qualified	women	and	the	Secretary	of	State’s	judgment	that	his	only	option	was	 to	appoint	 ‘a	 less	qualified	woman’	or	a	 ‘better	qualified	man’.		That	the	Secretary	of	State	found	it	plausible	that	no	suitably-qualified	Catholic	woman	was	available	 in	Northern	Ireland	also	raises	profound	questions	about	the	 qualification	 criteria	 attached	 to	 these	 appointments.	 While	 women	 are	under-represented	 across	 public	 appointments	 in	 the	 jurisdiction	 (32%),	 the	dearth	 of	 female	 applicants	 to	 the	 Parades	 Commission	 is	 striking	 (17%).	 In	dealing	with	the	police,	the	Loyal	Orders,	the	Parades	Commission,	the	Secretary	of	 State	 and,	 indeed,	 this	 Court,	 the	 belief	 that	 all	 relevant	 decision-making	 is	undertaken	 by	 men	 must	 have	 been	 powerful	 for	 the	 applicant	 and	 her	associates.	The	High	Court’s	determination	that	parading	engages	‘the	sectarian	blocks’	 and	 that	 the	 obligation	on	 the	 Secretary	of	 State	 is	 therefore	 to	 ensure	‘sectarian	 balance’	 in	 appointments	 to	 the	 Commission	 no	 doubt	 further	compounded	 a	 view	 of	 decision-making	 in	 parading	 as	 an	 exclusively	 male	activity.	 The	 good	work	 of	 non-governmental	 organisations	 in	 the	 jurisdiction	such	as	Democratic	Dialogue	demonstrates	that,	while	women	are	no	less	likely	than	men	to	be	politically	active,	such	as	in	the	community	and	voluntary	sector,	women	 have	 much	 less	 access	 to	 political	 activities	 associated	 with	 power	(Democratic	Dialogue,	Power,	Politics	and	Positionings,	 1996).	 The	participation	of	women	in	parading	throughout	the	jurisdiction	and	the	impact	of	parading	on	the	 lives	of	women,	at	 the	same	time	as	their	exclusion	from	relevant	decision-making	is	judged	to	be	lawful,	is	another	example	of	this	dynamic.	The	murder	of	Rosemary	Nelson,	a	lawyer	prominent	in	legal	action	concerning	parading,	was	a	chilling	and	powerful	message	to	women	who	sought	to	challenge	this	status	quo	of	 exclusively	male	decision-making.	The	applicant	 and	her	 associates	were	no	doubt	constantly	aware	of	robust,	often	violent,	resistance	to	efforts	by	women	to	influence	parading	decision-making.		This	court	cannot	collude	in	the	further	marginalization	of	half	of	 the	population	 from	the	decision-making	 that	 shapes	their	 lives	by	 judging	the	respondent’s	behavior	 in	this	appointment	process	to	be	‘reasonable’.			The	 Code	 of	 Practice	 for	 Ministerial	 Appointments	 sets	 out	 that	 ‘All	 public	appointments	should	be	governed	by	the	overriding	principle	of	selection	based	on	merit’	(2.2).	Further,	 ‘no	one	who	has	not	been	reviewed	by	an	Independent	Assessor	 should	 be	 listed’	 within	 the	 appointable	 pool	 (2.3).	 The	 principle	 of	independent	 scrutiny	 is	 the	 second	 of	 the	 seven	 principles	 underpinning	 the	Code	of	Practice.	Merit	is	indeed	the	correct	and	fitting	touchstone	for	all	public	appointments,	 but	 this	 Court	 cannot	 endorse	 an	 understanding	 of	 merit	 that	permits	the	exclusion	of	the	skills,	knowledge	and	perspectives	of	women.	Merit	is	 not	 the	 antithesis	 of	 diversity,	 rather	 the	 principle	 of	 diversity	 is	 critical	 for	securing	a	meritorious	Commission.	The	Guidance	further	provides	that,	where	circumstances	arrive	that	are	not	covered	by	the	Guidance,	the	Commissioner’s	Office	 should	 be	 consulted	 (1.6).	 In	 the	 High	 Court,	 Carswell	 J	 at	 page	 440	appeared	 to	 give	 considerable	 weight	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 Commissioner	 for	Public	Appointments	gave	her	approval:		 ‘She	gave	her	approval	to	the	method	of	appointment,	stating	that	she	was	satisfied	 that	 the	 NIO	 had	 made	 every	 effort	 to	 ensure	 both	 that	 the	
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Commission	 was	 representative	 of	 the	 community,	 as	 far	 as	 was	practicable,	and	had	been	appointed	on	merit.’			Having	defended	his	actions	on	 the	basis	 that	 the	appointments	 to	 the	Parades	Commission	is	not	governed	by	the	Commissioner	for	Public	Appointments,	the	Secretary	of	State	cannot	now	seek	validation	 in	having	relied	on	 the	advice	of	that	 Office.	 It	 is	 the	 Court’s	 view	 that	 it	 was	 due	 only	 to	 the	 erroneous	interpretation	 of	 ‘representative	 of	 the	 community’	 identified	 above	 that	 the	Commissioner	for	Public	Appointments	arrived	at	this	conclusion.			For	the	reasons	elaborated	above,	the	Secretary	of	State	failed	to	ensure	that	the	appointments	 to	 the	 Parades	 Commission	 were	 representative	 of	 the	community,	as	far	as	practicable.		
	
The	Intervention	of	the	Northern	Ireland	Human	Rights	Commission			The	intervention	by	the	Northern	Ireland	Human	Rights	Commission	(NIHRC)	on	behalf	 of	 the	appellant	has	been	 the	 subject	of	 some	contention.	While	not	 the	specific	subject	of	appeal	in	this	case,	given	the	fledgling	nature	of	the	NIHRC	and	its	 nascent	 role	 in	 making	 interventions	 in	 judicial	 proceedings,	 I	 feel	 it	necessary	 to	 comment	 on	 the	 High	 Court’s	 treatment	 of	 the	 NIHRC	 written	intervention.	 It	 is	 clear	 from	his	 judgment	 that	Carswell	 J	 did	not	 consider	 the	NIHRC’s	 written	 submission,	 with	 its	 discussion	 of	 the	 relevant	 international	treaties	to	which	the	UK	is	party,	to	add	anything	of	consequence	to	address	the	specific	 issues	 before	 the	 court.	 In	 this	 case,	 the	 NIHRC’s	written	 submissions	identified	provisions	of	the	International	Covenant	on	Civil	and	Political	Rights,	the	 Convention	 on	 the	 Elimination	 of	 All	 Forms	 of	 Discrimination	 Against	Women	 and	 the	 Convention	 on	 the	 Political	 Rights	 of	Women,	 relevant	 to	 the	rights	 of	 women	 to	 political	 participation.	 This	 particular	 issue	 remains	 of	considerable	importance	to	society	in	Northern	Ireland	as	a	whole.		Even	 if	 the	 NIHRC’s	 intervention	 does	 not	 affirm	 the	 position	 of	 one	 of	 the	parties,	such	a	role	will	have	been	adjudged	by	the	Commissioners	as	important	for	 securing	 the	 role	of	human	 rights	 in	Northern	 Ireland.	For	 the	appellant	 in	this	action	in	particular,	challenging	as	she	is	the	exclusion	of	women	from	public	decision-making,	 the	 fact	 of	 the	 NIHRC’s	 intervention	 and	 the	 provides	 a	powerful	 reassurance	 that	 official	 bodies	 take	 these	 claims	 seriously.	However	frustrating	 some	 of	 my	 colleagues	 might	 find	 an	 element	 of	 generality	 in	submissions	before	the	Court,	this	is	a	small	price	to	pay	for	the	societal	benefits	thereby	secured.	I	would	therefore	disagree	with,	and	indeed	deplore,	any	effort	to	 disparage	 the	 role	 of	 the	 NIHRC	 in	 bringing	 to	 the	 Court’s	 attention	 to	 the	international	legal	commitments	of	the	UK	in	this	regard.		
